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I. INTRODUCTION
"Localism has been a cornerstone of broadcast regulation for decades."'
One could point to numerous decisions in which the Federal Communica-
tions Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") has solemnly intoned some
version of that mantra to justify the notion that a broadcaster is under some
obligation to provide locally-oriented programming "responsive to its
community."2 What does the Commission mean when it refers to this cor-
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1 In re Broadcast Localism, Notice of Inquiry, 19 F.C.C.R. 12,425, 1 (July 7, 2004).
[hereinafter Localism Inquiry].
2 Id. 3. See In re Children's Television Programming and Advertising Practices,
Report and Order, 96 FCC2d 634, 45 (Dec. 22, 1984) (referring to "[t]he bedrock obliga-
tion of every broadcaster to be responsive to the needs and interests of its community").
See also In re Amendment of Section 73.202(b), Table of Allotments, FM Broadcast Sta-
tions (Wickenburg and Salome, Arizona), Report and Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 7222, 4 (Apr.
10, 2002).
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nerstone or bedrock concept of localism? More importantly, what is the
basis for that concept and how has the FCC enforced it?
The history of broadcast regulation suggests that the concept of localism,
as the FCC now expresses it, has, at best, no more than a marginal and
indirect legislative basis. While repeatedly paying lip service to this ideal-
ized notion of localism, the Commission has time and again acted in near
total disregard of a supposed localism obligation.
In 2004, prodded by reaction to its revised multiple ownership rules3
(and to the supposed Pandora's boxful of evils which may have been
unleashed by those rules), the Commission released a notice of inquiry
("Localism Inquiry") designed to explore the broad concept of localism.4
Because of the dramatic, all-encompassing scope of the Localism Inquiry,
it could be suggested that the inquiry was little more than a misdirection or
diversion deployed by the Commission to placate its critics and was never
likely to be concluded. With no action taken and none on the immediate
horizon almost three years later, such criticism seems increasingly well
founded.
But in January, 2007, it was reported that Chairman Kevin Martin had
advised members of the Senate Commerce Committee that the Commis-
sion will complete the Localism Inquiry and release a report in that matter
before the Commission completes its review of the media ownership rules.'
Thus, not only may the conclusion of the Localism Inquiry be in the offing,
but presumably, the Chairman expects that conclusion to affect the resolu-
tion of the ownership proceeding. Nonetheless, the Commission continues
to use, in certain technical areas, non-technical policies that are based on
assumptions derived from the FCC's idealized notion of localism.6
Since localism is expected to continue to be a factor in the FCC's deci-
sion-making processes for the foreseeable future-particularly ownership
and channel allotment-a review of the reality, as opposed to the myth, of
localism is now appropriate.
3 See In re 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Commission's Broad-
cast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecom-
munications Act of 1996; Cross-Ownership of Broadcast Stations and Newspapers; Rules
and Policies Concerning Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in Local Mar-
kets; Definition of Radio Markets; Definition of Radio Markets for Areas Not Located in
an Arbitrary Survey Area, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
18 F.C.C.R. 13,620, 2 (June 2, 2003).
4 Localism Inquiry, supra note 1, 7.
5 John Eggerton, Martin Promises Localism Study Before Ownership Moves, BROAD.
& CABLE, Jan. 8, 2007.
6 In re Applications of Faye and Richard Tuck, Inc. KBEC, Waxahachie, Texas, Blue-
bonnet Radio Broadcasters, Inc. Piano, Texas, Century Broadcasting Corporation Garland,
Texas, Dontron, Inc. KPBC, Garland, Texas, For Construction Permit for a New AM Sta-
tion, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 3 F.C.C.R. 5374, 3-5 (Aug. 24, 1988).
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II. WHAT IS LOCALISM?-A WORKING DEFINTION
The precise definition of localism is difficult to articulate. In the Intro-
duction to the Localism Inquiry, the Commission asserts that the agency
has consistently held that "licensees must air programming that is respon-
sive to the interests and needs of their communities of license."7 The Intro-
duction also refers to a broadcaster's "public interest obligation of provid-
ing programming that is responsive to its community."8 From this we may
conclude that when the Commission refers to localism it is referring to this
obligation-the required airing of some kind of responsive programming
directed specifically to a station's community of license.
But for a supposedly fundamental, bedrock obligation, this definition is
vague. What, after all, does "responsive" mean? What types of "program-
ming" will suffice? How much programming is enough? How must that
programming be "directed" to the community? The Commission has his-
torically failed to shed any light on those questions.
Perhaps the statutory source of localism could help illuminate the Com-
mission's thinking. According to the Localism Inquiry, the "concept of
localism derives from Title III of the Communications Act," both from the
general "public interest, convenience and necessity" standard which ap-
pears in Sections 307(c) and 309(a) of the Communications Act of 1934
("1934 Act") and also from Section 307(b), which explicitly requires the
Commission to "make such distribution of licenses, frequencies, hours of
operation, and of power among the several States and communities as to
provide a fair, efficient, and equitable distribution of radio service to each
of the same."9
As a preliminary matter, the fact that the Commission refers generally to
a monolithic Title III rather than citing specific statutory language indi-
cates that there is no particular statutory basis for any government-imposed
broadcast localism requirement. According to the Commission, the concept
of localism "derives" from that broad authority. In other words, localism is
not spelled out anywhere, but somehow springs up from the totality of the
statute, or as some penumbras and emanations from the "public interest,
convenience and necessity."
The Commission does refer specifically to Section 307(b), which man-
dates equitable distribution of broadcast licenses "among the several States
and communities."'0 But that language does not require the Commission to
7 Localism Inquiry, supra note 1, 1.
8 In re Standardized and Enhanced Disclosure Requirements for Television Broadcast
Licensee Public Interest Obligations, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 15 F.C.C.R.
19,816, 3 (Sept. 14, 2000) (emphasis added).
' 47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (2000).10 Localism Inquiry, supra note 1, 2; see also § 307(b).
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assign a specific community of license to each broadcast station." Nor
does that language refer in any way to programming of any sort, much less
to programming which is somehow responsive to a station's community of
license.
Of course, the statutory "public interest, convenience and necessity"
standard provides the Commission with considerable interpretative lati-
tude. It is certainly possible that the notion of localism might be deemed a
permissible agency interpretation of the scope of its authority, but the lan-
guage of the Communications Act does not explicitly mandate localism
requirements as articulated by the Commission.12 Thus, a review of local-
ism must begin with the notion, as expounded by the Commission, that that
term refers to an obligation that broadcasters "air programming that is re-
sponsive to the interests and needs of their communities of license." 3
11 The concept of a "community of license"--i.e., a community to which a broadcast
station is assigned and to which that station owes some special obligation-is not defined,
or even generally outlined, in Title III of the 1934 Act. The phrase "community of license"
appears only once in Title III in a narrow section that was added in 1991. 47 U.S.C. §
331(b) (relating to technical service to be provided by certain AM stations). The Commis-
sion itself has acknowledged that the 1934 Act does not require that each station be limited
to a single community of license. In re Amendment of Part 3 of the Rules and Regulations
Governing Main Studio and Station Identification of the Television Broadcast Stations,
Refort and Order, 22 F.C.C. 1567 (Mar. 13, 1957).
2 The source of the Commission's authority to regulate any programming is similarly
non-specific. That authority has been held by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit to be based on the public interest language of Sections 307(a) and (d) of
the 1934 Act, in connection with the FCC's authority to grant and renew broadcast li-
censes. See Office of Commc'n of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413, 1427-
28 (D.C. Cir. 1983). In that case (which involved review of the FCC's 1981 decision de-
regulating the commercial radio industry), the Commission had characterized an overall
obligation to provide public interest programming-an obligation similar to but seemingly
a bit broader than localism-as non-statutory. See In re Deregulation of Radio, Report and
Order (Proceeding Terminated), 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 977 (Jan. 14, 1981). In a footnote, the
Court asserted that the FCC's characterization was an error, and that the public interest
standard "clearly imposes statutory nonentertainment programming obligations on licen-
sees." Office of Commc'n of United Church of Christ, 707 F.2d at 1429 n.46. However,
apart from the general public interest standard, the Court pointed to no specific statutory
provision addressing any particular programming obligations of any sort. The Court's
facile assertion of some "clear[ ] ... statutory" basis for programming regulation may be
read, in Chevron terms, to indicate that the Communications Act affords the Commission
discretion to regulate programming in the public interest if the Commission deems such
regulation appropriate-a Chevron II analysis. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984) (holding that where Congress is silent an ad-
ministrative agency's construction of an ambiguous statute is accorded deference as long as
the agency's interpretation is reasonable). By contrast, it seems clear that the vague lan-
guage of the Communications Act could not support a determination that the FCC is under
a clear and unequivocal Chevron I mandate to engage in such regulation.
13 Localism Inquiry, supra note 1, T 7.
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III. LOCALISM-IN THE BEGINNING
As noted above, the broad public interest language of Title III of the
1934 Act includes no language which directs the Commission to consider
community of license in any way in its broadcast licensing activities. But
Section 307(b), also specifically referenced by the Commission in the Lo-
calism Inquiry, mandates equitable distribution of radio service among the
"several States and communities."' 4 Perhaps the history of Section 307(b)
may shed some light on the source of the localism obligation.
A. The Federal Radio Act and the Davis Amendment
The Federal Radio Act of 1927"s ("1927 Act") was the precursor to the
1934 Act. Closely resembling what is now Section 307(b), section nine of
the 1927 Act provided:
In considering applications for licenses and renewal of licenses, when and insofar as
there is a demand for the same, the licensing authority shall make such a distribution of
licenses, bands of frequency of wave lengths, periods of time for operation, and of
power among the different States and communities as to give fair, efficient and equita-
ble radio service to each of the same.
6
Like Section 307(b), that section made no reference to any programming
obligation. Nor did it provide that individual broadcast stations would be
tied to specific communities of license. It merely directed the "fair, effi-
cient and equitable"'7 distribution of radio service among the different
States and communities.
While the 1927 Act did include reference to communities, the Federal
Radio Commission ("FRC"), established by the 1927 Act appears to have
read section nine as directing distribution of broadcast licenses by state.
Then Chairman William H.G. Bullard wrote in August 1927, that "the
commission is quite aware of the section of the Federal Radio Act of 1927
which intimated that stations should be allotted on an equitable basis
among States, and that is one of the dominating features of the action of
the commission at this time."' 8 Note that Bullard referred only to states and
not to communities. Note also Bullard's use of the verb "intimated," which
strongly suggests that he, for one, did not read section nine of the 1927 Act
to provide clear and unequivocal instruction to the FRC on this point.
Congress agreed in 1928 when it passed the Davis Amendment, 9 a pro-
vision which amended section nine and directed the FRC to "make a fair
14 See Localism Inquiry, supra note 1, 2; see also § 307(b).
15 Federal Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162.
16 Id. § 9, 1166.
17 Id.
'8 1928 FRC ANN. REP. 1, 82 [hereinafter SECOND ANNUAL REPORT] available at
http://www.fcc.gov/fcc-bin/assemble?docno=2810262 (emphasis added).
9 Radio Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 70-195, 45 Stat. 373 (1928).
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and equitable allocation of licenses, wave lengths, time for operation, and
station power to each of the States, the District of Columbia, the Territo-
ries, and possessions of the United States within each zone,2° according to
population."'" Congress strongly indicated that its intended geographical
focus for broadcast allotments was the state or zone, not the individual
community by deleting "communities" from the statutory directive con-
ceming allotment of broadcast service.
The 1927 Act included a provision which divided the country into five
geographical zones.22 Through an elaborate quota system developed pursu-
ant to the Davis Amendment, broadcast services were to be distributed by
the FRC among the states and zones according to "quota units" of broad-
cast facilities.23 The Davis Amendment changes to section nine of the 1927
Act specified that "[a]llocations shall be charged to the State, District, Ter-
ritory, or possession wherein the studio of the station is located and not
where the transmitter is located., 24 Pursuant to that language the FRC
adopted General Order No. 28 on April 20, 1928, which provided that
allocations were to be charged to the state (or district, territory, or posses-
sion) where the station's studio was located. But the FRC went further,
holding in General Order No. 28 that:
[N]o broadcasting station shall move its studio outside of the borders of the State, Dis-
trict, Territory, or possession in which it is located without first making written appli-
cation to the commission for authority to so move studio and securing written permis-
sion from the commission for such removal. This order does not apply to transfer or
removals of studios within the borders of the same State, District, Territory, or posses-
sion.
25
So while a station's location-the closest the 1927 Act comes to the no-
tion of community of license-was to be determined by the site of the sta-
tion's studio, General Order No. 28 freed the station's licensee to move
that studio-and, therefore, its location-anywhere in the state without
prior FRC approval. Clearly, a station's precise location, or community of
license, was not of particular concern, so long as the FRC knew which
state the station was in.
20 Under Section two of the 1927 Act, the country was divided into five zones. H.R.
9917, 169th Cong. § 2 (1927). Each of the five FRC Commissioners was assigned respon-
sibility for one of the zones. H.R. 9971 § 3.
21 Radio Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 70-195, § 5, 45 Stat. 373 (1928) (amending
section nine of the 1927 Act).
22 Federal Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, § 2,44 Stat. 1162-63.
23 The quota units to which each state or zone was entitled were subject to change
based on, inter alia, updated census information which changed the relative populations
among the states and zones. See 1932 FRC ANN. REP. 1, 25-27, available at
htt,://www.fcc.gov/fcc-bin/assemble?docno=3212051.
4 Radio Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 70-195, § 5, 45 Stat. 373 (1928) (amending
section nine of the 1927 Act).
25 SECOND ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 44, available at http://www.fcc.gov/fcc-
bin/assemble?docno=2810261.
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In late 1930, the FRC revisited General Order No. 28 to prevent reloca-
tion of a station's "main studio outside of the borders of the city, State,
District, Territory, or possession in which it is located" without prior ap-
proval of the FRC.26 The FRC further defined the term "main studio" to be
the studio "from which the majority of the local programs originate and
from which a majority of station announcements are made of programs
originating at remote points., 27 But the Davis Amendment still limited the
focus of allocation to states or zones, and that limitation remained in effect
through the life of the FRC. It can therefore be concluded that section nine
of the 1927 Act-the antecedent of Section 307(b)-did not give rise to
any obligatory notion of localism.
28
Moreover, the FRC provided no indication that the general public inter-
est, convenience, or necessity language of the 1927 Act imposed any obli-
gation to provide locally-oriented programming, despite the fact that sev-
eral sections of the 1927 Act contained the public interest, convenience, or
necessity standard (as is the case with the 1934 Act). In a statement issued
August 23, 1928 on the subject of that statutory language, the FRC made
no mention of any obligation to provide locally-oriented programming.29
The FRC did acknowledge that a licensee's programming performance
would be considered in connection with any applications for modification
or renewal of licenses, but never suggested that programming responsive to
local needs and interests might be deemed a material, let alone obligatory,
element.3°
26 1931 FRC ANN. REP. 1, 84, available at http://www.fcc.gov/fcc-
bin/assemble?docno=3112072. The FRC revisited General Order No. 28 in its General
Order No. 98, which was adopted October 27, 1930.
27 Id.
28 The FRC was, of course, aware of the programming practices of various licensees
because they proffered their programming performance in support of applications for im-
proved facilities and/or renewal of license. But there is no indication that the FRC deemed
the provision of local programming to be a sine qua non to the grant of such applications.
See also Kristine Martens, Comment, Restoring Localism to Broadcast Communications,
14 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. LAW 285, 293 (2004) (arguing that in the early days of
radio large commercial stations were more likely to secure licenses than emerging, small
stations because more people could listen to the larger, more powerful stations).
29 SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 18, app. F(6) at 166-70.
30 Id. The FRC report listed some examples of programming performance that would
be considered. Generally, the FRC viewed the broadcast of phonograph records as undesir-
able. "A station which devotes the main portion of its hours of operation to broadcasting
such [ordinary commercial type] phonograph records is not giving the public anything
which it can not readily have without such a station." Id. at 168. But the FRC stopped short
of banning such broadcasts altogether. Id. ("[T]he commission will not go so far at present
as to state that the practice is at all times and under all conditions a violation of' the public
interest standard.). The FRC was also skeptical of advertising and commercially-supported
programming. "Such benefit as is derived by advertisers must be incidental and entirely
secondary to the interest of the public." Id. But again, the FRC allowed itself to be per-
suaded in some instances that "there seems to exist a strong sentiment in favor of such
advertising on the part of the listening public." Id. The FRC curiously singled out Iowa as a
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In practice, the FRC articulated no localism obligation. When the FRC
did identify an applicant who had provided only minimal locally-oriented
programming, the FRC declined to revoke its license, although it reduced
the station's operating power.3 When the FRC identified a station which
had "devoted itself to furnishing wholesome amusement and information"
and was "distinctly a community proposition," the FRC renewed its li-
cense, but with the caveat that "a station such as this could not expect to
enjoy a large assignment of power, but should be allowed to continue in
serving the community as it has been doing in the past., 32 In other words,
while renewal applicants could seek to rely on their past programming, the
FRC gave no indication that some level of programming responsive to
local needs and interests was even necessarily expected, much less re-
quired, of broadcasters. Thus, the 1927 Act and the FRC's interpretation of
that Act do not provide any support for the notion that the FCC now refers
to as localism.
The 1934 Act replaced the 1927 Act and established the FCC in place of
the FRC. 33 Section 307(b) of the 1934 Act was effectively identical to sec-
tion nine of the 1927 Act, as that act had been amended in 1928. 34 That is,
Section 307(b) of the 1934 Act preserved the Davis Amendment's zone-
quota system, providing that:
[T]he people of all zones established by this title are entitled to equality of radio-
broadcasting service, both of transmission and of reception, and in order to provide
said equality the Commission shall as nearly as possible make and maintain an equal
place which had demonstrated such "strong sentiment." Finally, a "word of warning" was
given "where two rival broadcasters in the same community spend their time in abusing
each other over the air." Id. at 169. The FRC found such programming "not only uninter-
esting but also distasteful to the listening public." Id.
Examples of situations in which the FRC declined to renew licenses on the basis of
programming include KFKB Broad. Ass'n. v. Fed. Radio Comm'n, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir.
1931), and Trinity Methodist Church, S. v. Fed. Radio Comm'n, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir.
1932). Those cases did not involve a failure to provide adequate local programming, but
rather the broadcast of programming which the FRC found to be affirmatively contrary to
the public interest.
31 SECOND ANNUAL REPORT supra note 18, at 155-56, (discussing Station WCRW).
According to the FRC, some three-quarters of the station's programming was devoted to
the broadcasting of phonograph records, and "a large part of the program[ming] [was]
distinctly commercial in character." Id. at 156. While the licensee "attempt[ed] ... to show
a very limited amount of educational and community civic service, . . . the amount of time
thus employed is negligible and the evidence of its value to the community is not convinc-
ing." Id. The FRC then concluded that "[m]anifestly this station is one which exists chiefly
for the purpose of deriving an income from the sale of advertising of a character which
might be objectionable to the listening public and without making much, if any, endeavor
to render any real service to that public." Id. Despite this harsh evaluation, the licensee was
allowed to continue broadcasting. Id. at 155.
32 Id. at 159.
33 Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064.
34 Compare Radio Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 70-195, 45 Stat. 373 (1928) with
Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 307(b), 48 Stat. 1064, 1084.
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allocation of broadcasting licenses, of bands of frequency, of periods of time for opera-
tion, and of station power to each of said zones when and insofar as there are applica-
tions therefor; and shall make a fair and equitable allocation of licenses, frequencies,
time for operation, and station power to each of the States and the District of Colum-
bia, within each zone, according to population.
35
By May 1935, when bill S. 2243 was introduced to repeal the Davis
Amendment, it was apparent to Congress and the FCC that the zone-quota
system of channel allotments was simply not workable.36 In a letter to the
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, FCC Chair-
man Anning S. Prall expressed the Commission's "hearty accord" with the
proposed bill, observing that the Davis Amendment "is very difficult of
administration and cannot result in an equality of radio broadcasting ser-
vice., 37 Congress enacted the bill June 5, 1936,38 amending Section 307(b)
to its present language and thereby eliminating the zone-quota system
which had set the allotment criteria for more than eight years.
B. Chain Broadcasting and the Network Effect
By then, however, the Commission was becoming aware of the distinctly
non-local effect of the radio broadcast industry's reliance on network pro-
gramming. In March 1938, the Commission commenced an extensive
study of the effects of such programming. That study culminated in the
1941 Report on Chain Broadcasting,39 and the adoption of Chain Broad-
casting Regulations which were affirmed by the Supreme Court in Na-
tional Broadcasting Co. v. United States.40
In view of its concern about the threat of non-local network dominance,
the Commission could have used the Report on Chain Broadcasting pro-
ceeding to articulate a local programming obligation, whether derived from
statute or other authority. If this local programming obligation existed, its
performance would be impeded by the type of excessive network domi-
nance resulting from simultaneous chain broadcasts. If private network
arrangements were found to be interfering with some government-imposed
local programming obligation, the agency charged with enforcing that ob-
ligation would presumably have cited chain broadcasting as an obstacle.
35 Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 307(b), 48 Stat. 1064, 1084.
36 S. 2243, 73rd Cong. (1934) (enacted).
37 Tyler Berry, Communications by Wire and Radio 134 (1937) (citations omitted).
38 Communications Act of 1934 § 307(b) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 307(b)
(2000)).
39 Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Report on Chain Broadcasting (1941) [hereinafter Report
on Chain Broadcasting].
40 319 U.S. 190 (1943). Chain broadcasting was defined in § 3(p) of the 1934 Act as
the "simultaneous broadcasting of an identical program by two or more connected sta-
tions." Communications Act of 1934, § 3(p).
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But the FCC stopped well short of articulating a local programming obliga-
tion. Instead, the Commission offered the following:
With the number of radio channels limited by natural factors, the public interest de-
mands that those who are entrusted with the available channels shall make the fullest
and most effective use of them. If a licensee enters into a contract with a network or-
ganization which limits his ability to make the best use of the radio facility assigned
him, he is not serving the public interest .... The net effect [of the network practices
disclosed by the investigation] has been that broadcasting service has been maintained
at a level below that possible under a system offree competition.
4 1
While this reflects the Commission's reliance on the public interest stan-
dard to justify its regulation of programming (including network program-
ming not originated by any particular Commission licensee), the FCC's
statement did not establish that there was a government-imposed pro-
gramming obligation. Rather, the FCC referred only to a theoretical level
of broadcasting service which might be possible "under a system of free
competition." '2
The Commission expressed that sentiment elsewhere in the Report on
Chain Broadcasting as well. Chain Broadcasting Regulation 3.104 limited
the extent to which networks could tie up "optional time"-time during
which the networks could, upon twenty-eight days notice, insist that the
local affiliated station air network programming. Since the time in question
would, absent exercise of the option by the network, be available to the
local station for local programming, the Commission was critical of such
option time provisions. According to the FCC, rescheduling a local pro-
gram in order to accommodate the network's option
may seriously interfere with the efforts of a [local] sponsor to build up a regular listen-
ing audience at a definite hour, and the long-term advertising contract becomes a
highly dubious project. This hampers the efforts of the station to develop local com-
mercial programs and affects adversely its ability to give the public good program ser-
vice .... A station licensee must retain sufficient freedom of action to supply the pro-
gram and advertising needs of the local community. Local program service is a vital
part of community life. A station should be ready, able, and willing to serve the needs
of the local community by broadcasting such outstanding local events as community
concerts, civic meetings, local sports events, and other programs of local consumer and
social interest. We conclude that national network time options have restricted the
freedom of station licensees and hampered their efforts to broadcast local commercial
programs, the programs of other national networks, and national spot transcriptions.
43
This statement makes clear that the FCC believed that locally-oriented
programming was an important aspect of a broadcaster's service to the
public. But the statement again stopped short of suggesting that the provi-
sion of such programming was in any way required. To the contrary, the
Commission said that broadcasters should be prepared to serve community
needs with local programming-not that they were required to do so. In the
41 REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING, supra note 39, at 81-82 (emphasis added).
42 id.
41 Id. at 63, 65.
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final sentence of the quoted passage, the Commission drew no distinction
between local and national programming which could be inhibited by op-
tion time provisions.
The introduction to the Report on Chain Broadcasting reflected this
egalitarian treatment of local and network programming, where the Com-
mission stated:
If radio broadcasting is to serve its full function in disseminating information, opinion,
and entertainment, it must bring to the people of the nation a diversified program ser-
vice. There must be, on the one hand, programs of local self-expression, whereby mat-
ters of local interest and benefit are brought to the communities served by broadcast
stations. There must be, on the other hand, access to events of national and regional in-
terest and to programs of a type which cannot be originated by local communities. Nei-
ther type of program service should be subordinated to the other.
44
In the quest for the origins of localism, it appears that the notion of some
specific local programming obligation had not been identified by the
Commission as of the Report on Chain Broadcasting. Again, the Commis-
sion recognized that some "programs of local self-expression" were an
essential element of a broadcaster's "full function,"45 but the Commission
stopped well short of providing any specific meaning to that vague preca-
tory expression.
IV. FORM BUT NO SUBSTANCE
From its earliest days the FCC did suggest that it was interested in the
extent to which applicants for new broadcast licenses were familiar with
and intended to serve local interests and needs. For example, in its broad-
cast licensing activities, the Commission inquired into the extent to which
applicants were familiar with their proposed communities of license. 46 But
once an applicant convinced the FCC that the applicant really might do a
good job of serving the local listenership, the Commission engaged in vir-
tually no follow-up to confirm that such service was in fact provided.47
44 Id. at 4.
45 Id.
46 See, e.g., In re H.K. Glass and M.C Kirkland (New), Eustis, F.L., For Construction
Permit, Lake Region Broadcast Company (New), Lakeland, F.L., For Construction Permit,
Robert Louis Sanders (New), Palm Beach, F.L., For Construction Permit, Hazlewood, Inc.
(New), West Palm Beach, F.L., For Construction Permit, 2 F.C.C. 365, 372 (Mar. 3,
1936); In re J. Lawrence Martin, Tucumcari, N.M., For Construction Permit, Docket No.
3316, 3 F.C.C. 461, 462 (Nov. 10, 1936); In re Eugene DeBogory, trading as Brownsville
Broadcast Company, Brownsville, TX., For Construction Permit, Denton Broadcast
Company, Eugene DeBogory, Owner, Denton, TX., For Construction Permit, 2 F.C.C.
336, 340 (Feb. 21, 1936).
47 Indeed, in 1935, when the sale of a broadcast license was proposed, the FCC did not
even ask the proposed purchaser about its intended program service. FED. COMMC'NS
COMM'N, PUBLIC SERV. RESPONSIBILITY OF BROAD. LICENSEES 7 (1946) [hereinafter BLUE
BOOK].
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License renewal applicants had been asked, as early as 1928, to disclose
the amounts of certain types of programming they had provided during the
preceding license term.48 The goal of the Commission was to assure a
"well-balanced program structure" which was "essential" to broadcasting
in the public interest. 4" But such showings were routinely ignored.
A. The Blue Book
As Chairman Paul A. Porter described the situation in an address to the
National Association of Broadcasters in March, 1945:
Briefly the facts are these: an applicant seeks a construction permit for a new station
and in his application makes the usual representations as to the type of service he pro-
poses. These representations include specific pledges that time will be made available
for civic, educational, agricultural and other public service programs. The station is
constructed and begins operations. Subsequently the licensee asks for a three-year re-
newal and the record clearly shows that he has not fulfilled the promises made to the
Commission when he received the original grant. The Commission in the past has, for
a variety of reasons, including limitations of staff, automatically renewed these li-
censes even in cases where there is a vast disparity between promises and perform-
50
ance.
This candid acknowledgement led to a detailed review of the Commis-
sion's standards for renewal of broadcast licenses. The results of that re-
view were set out in the FCC's Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast
Licensees ("Blue Book")-an extensive study that underscored the truth of
Porter's words. The Blue Book listed multiple instances in which the actual
programming performance of licensees could have justified denial of re-
newal and yet the licenses were renewed anyway. 1
48 Renewal applicants were asked to state the average percentage of time per month
devoted to either commercial or sustaining (i.e., noncommercial) programs in the following
categories:
(1) Entertainment; (2) [e]ducational; (3) [r]eligious; (4) [a]gricultural; (5) [c]ivic (includ
[sic]in this item fraternal, Chamber of Commerce, charitable and other civic but non-
governmental programs); (6) [g]ovemmental (includ [sic] in this item all municipal, state
and federal programs, including political or controversial broadcasts by public officials, or
candidates for public office, regardless of whether the programs so included under this item
are entertainment, educational, agricultural, etc., in character); (7) [n]ews; (8)
[sic]; (9) [tlotal.
Id. at 13 n. 1 (internal quotations omitted). Note that the precise nature and extent of par-
ticularly local programming is not included in the listed categories.
49 Id. at 12.
" Id. at 3.
51 One example cited by the Blue Book is particularly striking. A station sought author-
ity to operate at night, arguing that it would thereby be able to provide to its community of
license a "local program service" not otherwise available at night. The Commission
granted the application. Within eight months the station had affiliated with a national net-
work and, within five years, "the 'local' programs upon which [the applicant] had relied
were conspicuous by their absence." Id. at 6. The Commission observed that, "[iln contrast
to [the applicant's] allegations that time after 6 p.m. was sought for local public service, the
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Defensively, the Commission asserted that it had "given repeated and
explicit recognition to the need for adequate reflection in programs of local
interests, activities and talent. '52 It also pointed to its adoption of Chain
Broadcasting Regulation 3.104, which was intended "to foster the devel-
opment of local programs.53 But the Commission also admitted that Regu-
lation 3.104 had been a failure in that regard.14 The Commission ultimately
concluded that "the soundness of a local program policy does not rest
solely on the consistent Commission policy of encouraging a reasonable
proportion of local programs as part of a well-balanced program service."55
When looking for the origins of localism, that ultimate conclusion is sig-
nificant. It reflects that the view of the Blue Book Commission was that the
provision of some level of local programming was merely the subject of a
policy of encouragement, and not a matter of specific, express regulatory
obligation. Even while the FCC opined that "[a] positive responsibility
rests upon local stations to make articulate the voice of the community,"56
the Commission was admitting that the "statistics of local programming
during [the 'front page hours' of 6-11 p.m.], or generally, are not impres-
sive."57
But having made this concession, the Commission failed to flex its ex-
pansive public interest regulatory muscle and impose some affirmative
obligation designed to reverse the unimpressive amount of local program-
ming.
The FCC first assigned "[p]rimary responsibility for the American sys-
tem of broadcasting" to broadcast licensees and the networks. "It is to the
stations and networks rather than to federal regulation that listeners must
primarily turn for improved standards of program service."" While the
FCC did acknowledge that it had some role to play, it characterized that
role as subordinate. "The Commission, as the licensing agency established
by Congress, has a responsibility to consider overall program service in its
public interest determinations, but affirmative improvement of program
service must be the result primarily of other forces."59
This is not to say, however, that the Commission did nothing. While con-
tinuing to require renewal applicants to describe their programming per-
formance, the FCC committed to make appropriate modification of its
station broadcast only 20 minutes of local live sustaining programs after 6 p.m. during the
entire week [studied by the FCC]-10 minutes of bowling scores and 10 minutes of sports
news." Id.
52 Id. at 37.
53 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
14 Id. at 3 n.3.
" Id. at 37.
56 Id. at 39.
17 Id. at 38.
" Id. at 54.
'9 Id. at 54-55.
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forms and procedures and to undertake "a generally more careful consid-
eration of renewal applications."6 The Commission thus eschewed the
opportunity to articulate, codify, and enforce a specific local programming
obligation. Instead, it embraced a far less direct "promise versus perform-
ance" approach. Applicants for initial or modified authorizations would
provide certain types and amounts of programming in their applications,
and their actual programming performance would be compared with those
promises at renewal time.
In essence, that approach had been in place for more than a decade al-
ready and, as the Blue Book unquestionably demonstrated, that approach
had been largely unsuccessful up to that point. But in a triumph of hope
over experience (much like a second marriage), the 1946 Commission
committed to giving that approach another shot. This time, however, the
Commission would improve its application forms and make definitions of
various common terms in those forms more consistent with applicable
policies.
As a practical matter, however, the Commission failed to explain exactly
how those changes would alter the ultimate decision-making process vis-a-
vis renewal applications. In the Blue Book's concluding section (suppos-
edly explicating its approach to "Action on Renewals"), the Commission
merely described in general terms the various types of data it expected to
have available through the renewal process.6" Those descriptions were not
especially detailed or informative, but at least they appeared to lay a foun-
dation on which the Commission might develop a detailed approach to the
agency's practical assessment of those data in the renewal context.
The Commission, however, did not do this. Instead, the Commission
concluded the Blue Book with the following: "If the Commission is able to
determine on the basis of the data thus available that a grant will serve the
public interest, it will continue as heretofore, to grant forthwith; otherwise,
as heretofore, it will designate the renewal application for hearing. 62 The
broadcast industry could be forgiven if it did not read that as a declaration
of a specific local programming obligation. The Blue Book's conclusion
60 Id. at 56.
61 The data identified by the Commission were: (1) "all the data concerning engineer-
ing, legal, accounting and other matters, as heretofore;" (2) a "responsible estimate of the
overall program structure appropriate for the station in question, as estimated by the licen-
see himself when making his previous application;" (3) the licensee/applicant's "affirma-
tive representations," or promises, "concerning time to be devoted to sustaining programs,
live programs, discussion programs, and advertising matter;" (4) data from annual reports
concerning the station's actual programming performance during composite weeks from
each year of the license term; (5) "a statement of the overall program structure of the sta-
tion during a week immediately preceding the filing of' the license renewal application;
and (6) "the station's representations concerning program service under the license applied
for." Id. at 58-59.
62 Id. at 59.
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appeared to be little more than a restatement of business as usual. The
Commission reaffirmed its belief that local programming was in the public
interest; it expected that applicants would set out their programming pro-
posals; and it intended to compare those proposals against actual program
performance as demonstrated in renewal applications. While the defini-
tions of particular program-related terms might be made more precise in
the interest of uniformity and consistent analysis, the most important ques-
tions were left unanswered. How, and according to what standards or
benchmarks, would the Commission evaluate programming performance?
The Commission did attempt to develop various rules which might indi-
rectly assure that broadcasters were providing local service to their respec-
tive communities of license. But those rules still stopped short of any spe-
cific localism requirement.
B. Program Origination
One focal point for the Commission was the main studio rule. As indi-
cated above, the 1927 Act had identified a broadcast station's location as
the site of its studio. 63 By 1949, however, the Commission had recognized
that the main studio rule then in effect led "to meaningless results,"' and
commenced a rulemaking proceeding in 1948 to revise the definition of
main studio.65 That proceeding was resolved in 1950.66
In Program Origination, the Commission noted that a station's "location
includes both transmitter and studio location and for many purposes the
latter is the more significant. ' 67 The Commission cited Section 307(b)'s
requirement of "fair, efficient and equitable distribution of radio service"
and explained that, in that context, the term radio service "comprehends
both transmission and reception service."68 The Commission continued:
Transmission service is the opportunity which a radio station provides for the devel-
opment and expression of local interests, ideas, and talents and for the production of
radio programs of special interest to a particular community. . .. It is the location of
the studio rather than the transmitter which is of particular significance in connection
with transmission service .... [A] station cannot serve as a medium for local self ex-
63 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
64 In re Application of Pawtucket Broad. Co. (WFCI) Pawtucket, Rhode Island For
Modification of License, 4 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1345, 1352 n.5 (Apr. 15, 1949).
65 At the time, Section 3.12 defined a station's main studio as "the studio from which a
majority of [the station's] local programs originate, and/or from which a majority of its
station announcements are made of programs originating at remote points." Id. at 1352
(internal quotations omitted).
66 In re Promulgation of Rules and Regulations Concerning the Origination Point of
Programs of Standard and FM Broadcast Stations, 1 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 91:465 (Dec. 13,
1945) [hereinafter Program Origination].
67 Id. at 571.
68 id.
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pression unless it provides a reasonably accessible studio for the origination of local
programs.
It is apparent that § 307(b) and the Commission's efforts to apply it may be largely
frustrated if, after a station is licensed for the purpose of providing both reception and
transmission service to a particular community, it removes its main studio to a distant
point and originates all or substantially all of its programs in a city or town other than
that which it was licensed to serve. Such action on the part of the station may substan-
tially cut away the basis of the Commission's decision authorizing the establishment of
the station.
69
This passage contains several different elements related to the develop-
ment of the localism concept. First, the Commission tied Section 307(b) to
the notion of "transmission service," as distinct from "reception service."
The Commission clearly felt that its mandate to provide fair, efficient and
equitable distribution of radio service required it to provide transmission
service to particular localities in some fashion.
Second, the Commission provided a definition of transmission service:
"the opportunity which a radio station provides for the development and
expression of local interests, ideas, and talents and for the production of
radio programs of special interest to a particular community., 70 Note, how-
ever, that the Commission spoke only in terms of the opportunity that es-
tablishment of a radio station provided, not any statutorily-compelled duty
on the part of any licensee actually to fulfill such opportunity.
Third, the Commission acknowledged implicitly that its former main
studio rule-which tethered each station to its own particular community
and afforded that local community the potential opportunity for self-
expression-was completely ineffective at accomplishing such tethering.71
The Commission recognized that under its former rule (which was still in
effect at the time of Program Origination), a licensee could "remove[ ] its
main studio to a distant point and originate[ ] all or substantially all of its
programs in a city or town other than" its community of license, thereby
"largely frustrat[ing]" the Commission's efforts to apply Section 307(b).72
Concluding its deliberations in Program Origination, the Commission
amended its main studio rule. But in so doing, it did not impose any obliga-
tions relating to the provision of programming directed to the community
of license. Instead, it merely required that stations originate a majority of
their programs-or, for network-affiliated stations, the lesser of: (a) a ma-
jority of all their programs; or (b) £wo-thirds of their non-network pro-
grams-from their main studios. While the Commission may have hoped,
or even expected, that such a requirement would automatically spawn lo-
cally-oriented (as opposed to locally-originated) programming, the rule as
69 id.
70 id.
71 Id.
72 id.
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adopted did not demand, or even allude to, such programming. By adjust-
ing downward the program origination obligation of network affiliates, the
Commission seemed to return to the position articulated in the Report on
Chain Broadcasting that local programming should not be subordinated to
network programming, and vice versa.73
C. En Banc Programming Inquiry
A decade later, the Commission again undertook a comprehensive re-
view of the programming obligations of broadcasters.74 Motivated by a
1955 study of network television practices, the Commission focused on:
[1] whether the general standards heretofore laid down by the Commission for the
guidance of broadcast licensees in the selection of programs and other material in-
tended for broadcast are currently adequate; [2] whether the Commission should, by
the exercise of its rulemaking power, set out more detailed and precise standards for
such broadcasters; [3] whether the Commission's present review and consideration in
the field of programming ... are adequate, under present conditions in the broadcast-
ing industry."
' 75
In several respects, the conclusions of the En Banc Programing Inquiry
proved to be mere re-plays of the Blue Book, which preceded it by fourteen
years. Again, the Commission asserted that a "significant element of the
public interest is the broadcaster's service to the community.' ' 76 Referring
to the reception/transmission service dichotomy which it found inherent in
Section 307(b), the Commission said that the "end objective" of providing
transmission service was to "provid[e] a new or additional 'outlet' for
broadcasting from a community, area or state. Implicit in . . . [this trans-
mission service] alternative is increased radio transmission and, in this
connection, appropriate attention to local live programming is required., 77
The Commission expanded this somewhat, stating that:
The initial and principal execution of [the public interest, convenience and necessity]
standard, in terms of the area [the broadcast licensee] is licensed to serve, is the obliga-
tion of the licensee. The principal ingredient of such obligation consists of a diligent,
73 REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING, supra note 39, at 81-82.
74 Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Report and Statement of Policy Res: Commission En
Banc Programming Inquiry 2303 (1960) [hereinafter En Banc Programming Inquiry].
71 Id. at 2304.
76 Id. at 2310. While the Commission again concluded that the public interest standard
afforded it the general authority to regulate the nature of the service provided by broadcast-
ers, it specifically acknowledged that "[t]hus far Congress has not imposed by law an af-
firmative programing requirement on broadcast licenses." Id. at 2312 (quoting testimony of
Chairman Frederick W. Ford before the Senate Subcommittee on Communications on May
16, 1960). This further confirms the observation that there is no express statutory basis for
any programming obligation, including one involving localism.
7 Id. at 2311. But note that the Commission spoke in terms of a local outlet not for a
community, but for a "community, area or state." Again, the Commission did not mandate
programming directed to the licensee's community of license alone.
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positive and continuing effort by the licensee to discover and fulfill the tastes, needs
and desires of his service area.
78
And later still, the FCC noted that the "broadcaster is obligated to make
a positive, diligent and continuing effort, in good faith, to determine the
tastes, needs and desires of the public in his community and to provide
programming to meet those needs and interests.'79 "[T]he Commission
does expect its broadcast licensees to take the necessary steps to inform
themselves of the real needs and interests of the areas they serve and to
provide programming which in fact constitues [sic] a diligent effort, in
good faith, to provide for those needs and interests."8°
So, while it was echoing themes hinted at its earlier history, the Commis-
sion seemed to be venturing closer than it previously had to some substan-
tive programming obligation. But having offered up these general state-
ments, the Commission performed an about-face and disclaimed any regu-
latory obligation to provide any particular programming. The Commission
stated that its intention was not "to guide the licensee along the path of
programming; on the contrary, the licensee must find his own path with the
guidance of those whom his signal is to serve."8' The Commission was
only willing to describe another indirect mechanism which it hoped would
lead to appropriate public interest programming.
What the Commission proposed was a process of "assiduous planning
and consultation" by licensees which would include: (1) a "canvass of the
listening public who will receive the signal and who constitute a definite
public interest figure;" and (2) "consultation with leaders in community
life-public officials, educators, religious, the entertainment media, agri-
culture, business, labor-professional and eleemosynary organizations, and
others who bespeak the interest which make up the community., 82 Again,
this constituted a more detailed variation of the approach which had been
in place since the 1930s. 83 To be sure, the 1960 version was substantially
78 Id. at 2312 (emphasis added).
79 Id. at 2314 (emphasis added).
80 Id.
[T]he major elements usually necessary to meet the public interest, needs and desires
of the community in which the station is located as developed by the industry, and rec-
ognized by the Commission, have included: (1) opportunity for local self-expression,
(2) the development and use of local talent, (3) programs for children, (4) religious
programs, (5) educational programs, (6) public affairs programs, (7) editorialization by
licensees, (8) political broadcasts, (9) agricultural programs, (1) [sic] news programs
(11) weather and market reports, (12) sports programs, (13) service to minority groups,
(14) entertainment programs.
Id. But the Commission hastened to point out that these itemized elements "are neither all-
embracing nor constant" and re-emphasized "that they do not serve and have been intended
as a rigid mold or fixed formula for station operation." Id.
81 Id. at 2316.
82 Id,
83 Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 307(b), 48 Stat. 1064, 1084.
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more detailed, but the basic concept was the same. The Commission was
looking to the licensee to jump through certain hoops in order to inform
itself of the needs and interests of the community-the theory being that,
having jumped through the hoops, the now informed licensee would auto-
matically and ineluctably be driven to provide programming responsive to
those needs and interests.
In the En Banc Programming Inquiry the Commission articulated that
expectation explicitly:
By the care spent in obtaining and reflecting the views [through the canvass and con-
sultation process], which clearly cannot be accepted without attention to the business
judgment of the licensee if his station is to be an operating success will the standard of
programming in the public interest be best fulfilled. .. . It is the composite of [the
community input], led and sifted by the expert judgment of the licensee, which will as-
sure to the station the appropriate attention to the public interest which will permit the
Commission to find that a license may issue.
84
In other words, the Commission was relying on the broadcaster's enlight-
ened self-interest to guarantee public interest programming. The Commis-
sion assumed that "operating success" would result because the "business
judgment" of every broadcaster would compel him to "reflect the views"
(in his programming) of the various community representatives with whom
he consulted. Yet again, the Commission stopped short of imposing any
specific, mandatory programming regimen on broadcasters.
The basis for the Commission's reluctance to take such a step was dis-
closed in the next sentence of the En Banc Programming Inquiry:
By [the broadcaster's] narrative development, in his application, of the planning, con-
sulting, shaping, revising, creating, discarding and evaluating of programming thus
conceived or discussed, the licensee discharges the public interest facet of his business
calling without Government dictation or supervision and permits the Commission to
discharge its responsibility to the public without invasion of spheres offreedom prop-
erly denied to it.
85
Clearly, the Commission was consciously declining to involve itself in
any substantive regulation of programming because of concerns about
"inva[ding] spheres of freedom properly denied to it," by which it pre-
sumably meant freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment and
Section 326 of the 1934 Act.
The importance the Commission attached to the community contacts
submissions led the Commission to consider revisions to the form and con-
tents of reports which broadcasters would be required to submit. In other
words, it was a replay of the Blue Book conclusions fourteen years earlier,
and the Blue Book had done little beyond the agency's practice for a dec-
ade before then.
The En Banc Programming Inquiry thus revealed an ambivalent, if not
contradictory, agency. On the one hand, the Commission appears to have
84 EN BANC PROGRAMMING INQUIRY, supra note 74, at 2316.
85 Id. at 2316-17 (emphasis added).
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been far more willing in 1960 than previously to characterize issue-
responsive, locally-oriented programming as obligatory in some inchoate
sense. On the other hand, the Commission expressly acknowledged that it
was not involving itself in defining such programming or in providing any
useful or useable criteria, guidelines, norms, etc., to govern such program-
ming. It made clear that its refusal to do so was based on the agency's per-
ceived limit to its authority.
D. 1960's- 1970's: A Preponderance of Procedures
This dichotomy reveals an important truth about the Commission's his-
torical treatment of localism. While the Commission was willing to suggest
issue-responsive, locally-oriented programming was obligatory, the Com-
mission in fact viewed itself as unable to mandate the provision of such
programming.
Faced with the perceived public interest importance of such program-
ming on the one hand, and a perceived incapacity to require the provision
of such programming on the other, the Commission continually resorted to
increasingly elaborate regulatory devices that it felt it could permissibly
utilize. The Commission's goal was to create a regulatory system which, if
complied with, would effectively (but indirectly) compel broadcasters to
do something which the FCC could not obligate them to do. The Commis-
sion built that system entirely on the assumption that compliance with the
various non-programming rules would drive broadcasters to provide ac-
ceptable public interest programming, because that appears to be the only
approach the Commission felt itself able to take.
Those mechanisms-a number of which had been in effect in one form
or another since the earliest days of broadcast regulation-included re-
quirements that:
m each broadcast licensee maintain a main studio in the community of
license, from which a majority of the station's programming had to origi-
nate;8
6
m each broadcast licensee maintain, at its main studio or elsewhere in its
community of license, a local public inspection file containing information
86 See, e.g., Program Origination, supra note 66. See also In re Amendment of Parts 1
and 73 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Pertaining to Main Studio Location of
FM and Television Broadcast Stations, Report and Order, 27 F.C.C.2d 851 (Feb. 10, 1971)
[hereinafter Main Studio I]; In re Reiteration of Policy Regarding Enforcement of Main
Studio Rule, 55 Rad. Reg.2d (P&F) 1178 (1984); In re Amendment of Sections 73.1125
and 73.1130 of the Commission's Rules and Program Origination Rules for Radio and
Television Stations, Report and Order (Proceeding Terminated), 2 F.C.C.R. 3215, 2
(Apr. 16, 1987) [hereinafter Main Studio II].
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about the station's operations, which file would be available to the public
during regular business hours;
87
w each broadcast licensee maintain detailed logs (representative samples
of which were submitted to the Commission for its review with the sta-
tion's renewal application) which delineated, inter alia, the station's local
programming,8 8 while the processing of license renewal applications in-
cluded consideration of the quantity-but generally not the quality-of
local programming reflected in the application;
89
- each broadcast licensee undertake extensive, formalized efforts to ap-
prise themselves of the needs and interests of the community and to estab-
lish lines of direct communication between community representatives and
the station;90
v renewal applicants broadcast public notices concerning the renewal
process and inviting members of the public to submit comments on the
renewal applicant's performance during the preceding license term. 9'
During the two decades following the En Banc Programming Inquiry, all
of these devices were in place. During that time, the Commission found
only a small handful of licensees who were arguably undeserving of re-
newal due to program-related considerations. 9 The fact that the Commis-
87 See e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 73.3526 (2006); Office of Commc'n of United Church of
Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413, 1427-28 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Main Studio II, supra note 86,
38.
88 See e.g., In re Reregulation of Radio and TV Broadcasting, Order, 69 F.C.C.2d 979,
1002-1008 (Sept. 22, 1978) Office of Commc'n of United Church of Christ, 707 F.2d
at 1422.
89 See e.g., In re Amendment of Section 0.281 of the Commission's Rules: delegations
of authority to the Chief, Broadcast Bureau, Order, 59 F.C.C.2d 491 (May 6, 1976); In re
Applications of Intercontinental Radio, Inc. For Renewal of License of Station KSOL(FM)
San Mateo, California Afro-American Communications San Mateo, California San Mateo
Broadcasting Company, Inc. San Mateo, California For Construction Permit, Comparative
Hearing, 98 F.C.C.2d 608, 16-18 (July 17, 1984) (showing an assessment of a renewal
applicant's program performance includes references to local source of programming).?I See e.g., EN BANC PROGRAMMING INQUIRY, supra note 74; In re Primer on Ascer-
tainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, Part I, Sections IV-A and IV-B
of FCC Forms, Report and Order, 27 F.C.C.2d 650 (Feb. 18, 1971); In re Ascertainment of
Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, Memorandum Opinion and Order,
61 F.C.C.2d 1 (Sept. 15, 1976).
91 See In re Amendment of Section 1.580(m)(1)(iii) of the Rules, Governing Text of
Licensee Notice to Public of Broadcast Renewal Application Filings, Memorandum Opin-
ion and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 685, 3 (Aug. 22, 1972).
92 See, e.g., In re Applications of Moline Television Corp. (WQAD-TV), Moline, Ill.
For Renewal of License of WQAD-TV; Community Telecasting Corp., Moline, 11. For
Construction Permit, Decision, 31 F.C.C.2d 289 (Aug. 20, 1971); In re Application of
National Broadcasting Compnay, Inc. For Renewal of License of Station WRC-TV, Wash-
ington, D.C., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 52 F.C.C.2d 273 (Mar. 19, 1975); In re
Application of Talton Broadcasting Company For Renewal of License of Station WHBB,
Selma, Alabama, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 58 F.C.C.2d 169 (Feb. 19, 1976); In
re Application of Vogel-Hendrix Corporation For Renewal of License of Station WAMA,
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sion identified any such situations at all might suggest that the system was
working. In January 1970, there were already more than 7,500 licensed
stations.93 So in each renewal cycle the FCC had the opportunity to assess
7,500 programming performances. Considering the number of program-
ming showings thus available to be considered, the very small handful of
instances in which a licensee's performance was questioned is at most in-
significant.
V. DEREGULATION: DISMANTLING THE PROCEDURES
This is especially true in view of the fact that, during the same period,
hundreds of licenses were renewed, without comment, by the Broadcast
Bureau with the Commission's blessing, despite serious concerns about
those stations' programming performance. Unfortunately, there is no easily
researchable record concerning those hundreds of situations because of the
way the Commission handled them. Under the Commission's delegations
of authority, the Broadcast Bureau was authorized to act on renewal appli-
cations in which certain quantitative benchmarks were met.94 In a number
of cases, the Bureau elected to act, but not before advising the Commission
of the intended actions and giving the full Commission an opportunity to
direct some other approach. The Commission gave no such alternate direc-
tion-in fact, the majority of the Commission issued no opinion at all, as a
result of which the Bureau simply granted the applications without com-
ment or explanation.
It appears from the dissenting opinions of Commissioners Cox and John-
son that the Bureau may not in fact have had the delegated authority to act
Selma, Alabama, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 58 F.C.C.2d 495 (Feb. 19, 1976); In
re Applications of Leflore Broadcasting Company, Inc. (WSWG-AM) Greenwood, Missis-
sippi Dixie Broadcasting Company, Inc. (WSWG-FM) Greenwood, Mississippi For Re-
newal of Licenses, Decision, 65 F.C.C.2d 556 (July 13, 1977).
" Public Notice, Broadcast Station Totals for January 1970,
http://www.fcc.gov/mb/audio/totals/pdf/19700131.pdf.
4 The FCC's delegations of authority provided yet another very indirect mechanism
for the promotion of public interest programming. The Broadcast Bureau was given dele-
gated authority to act on renewal applications in which the applicant proposed a certain
minimum amount of non-entertainment programming (i.e., news, public affairs, or other
non-entertainment material). For AM stations, the minimum was 8%; for FM, 6%; for TV,
10%. See, e.g., In re Deregulation of Radio, Report and Order (Proceeding Terminated),
84 F.C.C.2d 968, 975 (Jan. 14, 1981). Applications proposing less than the relevant mini-
mum would be referred to the full Commission for consideration. This provided an incen-
tive for every renewal applicant to propose the appropriate minimum in order to avoid the
bureaucratic delays and potential complications inherent in suffering review by the full
Commission. The incentive, of course, had nothing to do with any benefit to the public.
Rather, the licensee was enticed to provide at least the minimum so the licensee might
secure more expedited (and presumably less rigorous) review of its renewal application.
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on all of those applications.95 In any event, it is clear from the detailed dis-
sents of Commissioners Cox and Johnson that many of the stations which
were granted renewals presented minimal, if any, public interest program-
ming."
Dissenting Commissioners Cox and Johnson's analyses, while arguably
not concluding that the licensees in question failed to provide adequate
public interest programming, certainly give rise to legitimate questions
concerning the actual program performance delivered by the licensees in
question. They also give rise to legitimate questions as to the actual level
of concern on the Commission's part about program performance. With
one or two Commissioners raising serious doubts about particular applica-
tions based on the Blue Book and the En Banc Programming Inquiry, the
fact that the Commission merely rubberstamped (without explanation) the
Bureau's decision to grant those applications suggests an agency that was
not eager to wade into program-based decision making. 97 To some degree,
the Commission's decision to grant these renewals despite apparent lack of
public interest programming merely echoed the agency's historical prac-
tice, as reflected in both the Blue Book and the En Banc Programming In-
quiry. But these latter day actions differed from those earlier actions.
Unlike the earlier actions, the Commission in the late 1960s and early
1970s did not wring its hands and commit to trying to impose additional
95 In re Renewal of Standard Broadcast Station Licenses, 7 F.C.C.2d 122, 132 (Jan. 25,
1967) (Comm'r Johnson, dissenting) ("Whether the authority to issue the renewals has
been delegated by the Commission to the Bureau is unclear.").
96 See id.; see also In re Applications for Renewal of Standard Broadcast and Televi-
sion Stations, Applications, 11 F.C.C.2d 809, 810 (Jan. 24, 1968) (Comm'r Johnson, dis-
senting). Commissioner Johnson objected to the "Commission's virtually complete lack of
concern for the programming performance and proposals of licensed stations."); In re
Applications for Renewal of Standard Broadcast and Television Licenses for District of
Columbia, Maryland, Virginia, and West Virginia, Application, 21 F.C.C.2d 35 (Sept. 24,
1969) (Comm'rs Cox and Johnson, dissenting); In re Application For Renewal of Broad-
cast Licenses for Alabama and Georgia, Application, 25 FCC2d 801 (Mar. 29, 1967)
(Comm'r Cox, dissenting); In re Renewals of Broadcast Licenses for Arkansas, Louisiana
and Mississippi, 42 F.C.C.2d 3 (May 31, 1973) (Comm'r Johnson, dissenting).
97 According to Commissioner Johnson, the majority of the Commission was endors-
ing, sub silentio, a marketplace approach to public interest programming. As described by
Johnson, that approach followed this line of logic:
The only feasible way to administer standards of programing quality is in the market-
place. Let the broadcaster program what he will. So long as (1) the broadcaster seeks to
maximize profit, (2) advertising revenue is based on size of audience, and (3) a given
market is served by competing stations, a station owner must program to interest the
public. ("The public interest is what interests the public.") When his programing qual-
ity falls below a given level, or commercial content rises too high, he will lose audi-
ence, his advertising rates will decline, and ultimately he will be driven out of the mar-
ket and into bankruptcy.
In re Renewal of Standard Broadcast Station Licences, 7 F.C.C.2d 122, 131 n.4 (Jan. 25,
1967) (Comm'r Johnson, dissenting). Neither the majority of the Commission, nor any
individual member of that majority, took exception to Johnson's characterization.
20071
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
regulatory devices that might improve programming performance in some
way. Indeed, but for the. extensive and detailed analyses of Cox and John-
son, the questionable performances which were being swept under the rug
would have been successfully swept under the rug. How many times did
this occur and disappear into the ether without a dissenting commissioner
to preserve for the Commission's general lack of interest in a given licen-
sees performance?
Commissioner Johnson's suggestion that the Commission had endorsed a
marketplace approach to public interest programming was expressly vali-
dated in 1981. Concluding a proceeding commenced in 1979, the Commis-
sion commenced the dismantling of the elaborate structures it had devel-
oped in an effort to prod, indirectly, broadcasters to provide public interest
programming. In Deregulation of Radio, the Commission eliminated pro-
gram logging, program reporting (in the renewal application or otherwise),
and formalized ascertainment. 98 The Commission concluded that such
mechanisms were not necessary to assure the provision of public interest
programming. Rather, the competitive marketplace was seen as the most
effective and appropriate determinant for programming decisions.99
Of course, the Commission included vague threats that it might interject
itself into the programming arena if it were to suspect that the private mar-
ketplace was not effective. ' °° But those threats were hollow, at best, be-
cause-as the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit recog-
nized in its two remands of the elimination of the logging requirement-by
abandoning the monitoring devices which might have permitted some ra-
tional assessment of the actual quantity-but not the quality-of such pro-
98 In re Deregulation of Radio, Report and Order (Proceeding Terminated),
84 F.C.C.2d 968, 975 (Jan. 14, 1981). See also In re Deregulation of Radio, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 87 F.C.C.2d 796 (July 30, 1981); Office of Commc'n of the United
Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983); In re Deregulation of Radio,
Second Report and Order (Proceeding Terminated), 96 F.C.C.2d 930 (Mar. 1, 1984);
Office of Commc'n of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 779 F.2d 702, 704 (D.C. Cir.
1985); In re Deregulation of Radio, Memorandum Opinion and Order (Proceeding Termi-
nated), 104 F.C.C.2d 505 (May 1, 1986). The Deregulation of Radio Report and Order of
1981 was followed in short order by In re Revision of Programming and Commercializa-
tion Policies, Ascertainment Requirements, and Program Log Requirements for Commer-
cial Television Stations, Report and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076 (June 27, 1984).
99 In its initial review of Deregulation of Radio, the D.C. Circuit remanded for some
additional agency explanation of the abandonment of the program logging requirement.
The court was concerned that the lack of any detailed record of a station's historical pro-
gramming would make it difficult, if not impossible, to meaningfully evaluate the nature
and extent of a renewal applicant's performance. On remand, the Commission adhered to
its initial position that detailed logging should no longer be required, but the court was still
reluctant to accept that supplemented explanation. Office of Commc 'n of the United Church
of Christ, 779 F.2d at 704. The court ultimately affirmed the abandonment of program logs
in the television deregulation proceeding (which paralleled the radio deregulation proceed-
ing). Id. at 712.
100 See id. at 709.
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gramming (i.e., program logging in connection with regular, standardized
reporting), the Commission made it effectively impossible, or at least
highly unlikely, that it would ever be able to make such an assessment in
the future.
The court's concern about the abandonment of logging was also based on
the perceived need to make available to the public (in each station's local
public file) programming records, and the court declined to affirm the
elimination of logging until the Commission satisfactorily addressed that
point. But after two additional opportunities for the FCC to explain itself,
the court was assured by the Commission that the continued availability of
the public file requirement, in combination with a new "issues/programs
list" requirement, would give members of the public ample information on
which to formulate either petitions to deny or comparative renewal applica-
tions aimed at bringing to the Commission's attention the supposed short-
comings of undeserving licensees.1 °1
10 Id. at 712. In its initial review of Deregulation of Radio, the court addressed the
argument, presented by several petitioners, that the FCC was unlawfully foreswearing any
type of non-entertainment programming regulation. The court rejected that argument,
asserting that, notwithstanding the scope of the Commission's deregulatory steps, a statu-
tory obligation to provide information programming remained and the Commission's new
approach was consistent with that obligation. Office of Commc 'n of the United Church of
Christ, 707 F.2d at 1426-30. But the court's discussion of that issue includes the candid
acknowledgement that "[n]either the Act itself nor the legislative history necessitates a
Commission requirement that licensees offer a particular type of programming--e.g., reli-
gious, educational, etc. In fact, Congress in the past has explicitly rejected proposals to
require compliance by licensees with subject-matter programming priorities." 1d. at 1430;
see also id. at 1429 ("[T]he Act provides virtually no specifics as to the nature of those
public obligations inherent in the public interest standard.").
The D.C. Circuit Court determined that the existence of some public interest program-
ming obligation could be confirmed by the fact that the Commission's "consistent course
of administrative conduct" vis-A-vis the supposed public interest programming obligation
had not been overturned by legislation. Id. at 1403 n.50. But, as we have seen in the his-
torical analysis thus far, the Commission's regulatory approach in this area was little more
than "do as I say, not as I do." That is, while the Commission repeatedly made expansive
statements about the supposed importance of issue-responsive, locally-oriented public
interest programming, the Commission took virtually no meaningful actions expressly
mandating or even defining such programming, much less penalizing any failure to provide
such programming.
While the court in Office of Commc 'n of the United Church of Christ repeatedly asserted
that some public interest programming obligation was inherent in the 1934 Act, the only
specific provision it could cite was the 1959 amendment which led to the establishment of
the Fairness Doctrine. Id. at 1429. Of course, the Fairness Doctrine has long since been
abandoned by the Commission, with the court's blessing. Id. at 1431-32. Moreover, to the
extent that the 1959 amendment reflects anything, it is that, when Congress believes that
some programming-related obligation should be specified, it is capable of specifying it.
Congress's acknowledged failure to specify any particular public interest programming
obligation may properly be interpreted as an indication that no such obligation has in fact
been intended.
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Deregulation was affirmed, largely because the Commission convinced
the court that the availability to the public, in each station's local public
file, of periodic issues/program lists describing to some limited degree the
station's issue-oriented programming would be sufficient to inform the
public-and, through the public, the Commission-of any licensee who
might not be performing adequately.0 2
But through gradual relaxations of the main studio rule, any notion of
that requirement tethering a station to a particular community vanished.
And, since the public file is required to be kept at the main studio, the prac-
tical availability and utility of the public file to members of the public in
the community of license vanished as well. Under the current terms of the
main studio rule, a station's main studio may be located according to any
one of three criteria. First, it can be in the station's community of license-
this is a holdover of the historical requirement. Second, it can be located
anywhere within twenty-five miles of the center of the community of li-
cense-this alone allows the placement of a main studio at a very consid-
erable distance from the community. Third, the main studio can be located
anywhere within the city-grade contours of any broadcast station of any
service which happens to be licensed to the community in question. 10 3
The last criterion stretches the traditional notion of a main studio, located
within the community of license, assuring some locally-responsive pro-
gramming beyond credulity. The city-grade contour of a Class C FM sta-
tion with maximum facilities can reach out to a radius of twenty-five to
fifty miles. °4 That means that clever placement of such a station's trans-
mitter could result in the station's main studio being as many as seventy to
eighty miles away from the community.0 5
102 Although not articulated by the Commission in its defense of deregulation, the pro-
gram origination component of the main studio rule was also in place at that time, pre-
sumably giving the Commission additional comfort that each station might remain an
opportunity for local self-expression, as the Commission had announced decades before.
See, e.g., Program Origination, supra note 66, at 571. But by 1987, the program origination
requirement had been eliminated. Main Studio II, supra note 86, at 3218-19.
103 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.1125, 73.210 (2006).
'04 § 73.211(b).
105 We may illustrate this mind-boggling notion this way. An FM station's service area
is, as a general rule, a circle whose center is the point at which the station's transmitter is
located. As indicated above, a full Class C FM station can have a city-grade service area
with a radius of up to fifty miles. If the licensee positions its transmitter thirty-five miles to
the east of the community of license, then that community will receive the level of service
required by the rules; Id. But the station's city-grade contour will extend forty miles or so
to the east of its transmitter site, i.e., away from the community of license. Since the main
studio can be located anywhere within the station's city-grade contour, the studio could be
located in the easternmost point of that contour, which would be seventy-five to eighty
miles away from the community. And that does not merely apply to the station with the
forty mile service radius. Any station licensed to the same community may avail itself of
the main studio placement opportunities presented by the highest power station in that
community.
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To appreciate the lassitude of the current main studio requirements, con-
sider that, under the twenty-five mile rule, °6 stations licensed to Crofton,
Maryland, or Reston, Virginia; could lawfully set up their main studios in
the Commission's lobby in Washington, since those communities are both
within twenty-five miles of Washington. And to provide some idea of the
remoteness of eighty miles distance, the following communities are well
within eighty miles of the Commission's offices: Front Royal, Virginia;
Culpeper, Virginia; Hagerstown, Maryland; Cambridge, Maryland; and
Easton, Maryland.
Plainly, the main studio rule as it presently stands cannot be expected to
encourage localism in any way, shape, or form. Since the local public
file-the availability of which was supposed to provide the basis for possi-
ble objections-is required to be kept at the main studio, the practical util-
ity of the public file is effectively non-existent. 107
As matters now stand, then, despite some eighty years of regulatory prot-
estations of the existence of some obligation to provide locally-oriented,
issue-responsive programming, the record indicates that the Commission
has never imposed or defined such an obligation in any meaningful way.
At most, the Commission repeatedly acknowledged that licensees often
plainly failed to satisfy whatever obligation may have existed, however it
might have been defined, and yet the FCC repeatedly and consistently re-
newed their licenses. Moreover, when faced with such apparent shortfalls
in performance, the most the Commission did was attempt to impose vari-
ous regulatory devices by which the Commission hoped, indirectly, to en-
courage better performance. When those devices proved less than fully
effective, more devices were imposed and more careful agency review was
promised. By the 1970s, however, the Commission appeared to have aban-
doned even that pretense.
And then came deregulation, with which the Commission eliminated
most of the regulatory devices. The devices which survived initial deregu-
lation-main studio rule, program origination, and local public file-have
since either been eliminated (program origination) or relaxed to the point
where it can no longer reasonably be claimed that they advance the notion
of localism.
106 § 73.1125(a)(3).
107 There is at least some anecdotal evidence supporting the notion that the public file is
a resource which the public does not utilize to any meaningful degree. In a petition for
rulemaking filed in 2006, counsel representing a number of broadcast stations urged the
Commission to eliminate the public file rule because the public never looks at the files. In
re Amendment of Sections 73.3526 and 73.3526 [sic] of the Commissioner's Rules (The
Public File Rules), Petition for Rulemaking, MB Docket No. 05-108 (Jan. 4, 2006) (sub-
mitted by David Tillotson) (accessible via FCC Electronic Comment Filing System). While
the Commission has initially solicited comment on that proposal, it has done nothing fur-
ther and the matter remains pending.
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VI. THE COMPARATIVE RENEWAL PROCESS AS A REFLECTION
OF THE FCC'S AVERSION TO PROGRAM REGULATION
The history of localism as set out above indicates that, while it was will-
ing to pay lip service to the notion of public interest programming, the
Commission chronically avoided having to involve itself in the substantive
evaluation of broadcast piogramming performance. As demonstrated by
the dissents of Commissioners Cox and Johnson, 10 8 by the late 1960s-
1970s, the Commission had even stopped paying lip service, choosing in-
stead simply to grant scores or even hundreds of renewal applications
without comment, notwithstanding their apparent programming deficien-
cies.
The Commission's historic treatment of the comparative renewal process
illustrates and underscores its reluctance to take any action consistent with
its repeated solemn incantations concerning some bedrock programming
obligation. The comparative renewal process required the Commission to
consider competing applications filed against broadcast renewal applica-
tions. Until Congress eliminated the comparative renewal process in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996,1"9 every time a broadcast licensee sought
renewal of its license, anyone could prepare and file an application propos-
ing to use the existing station's channel for a new operation. Upon the fil-
ing of such a challenge application, the Commission had to designate the
renewal application and the challenge application for comparative hearing.
In such a hearing the incumbent renewal applicant's programming per-
formance during the preceding license term would be a central focus of the
proofs."'0
The comparative renewal process afforded the Commission an ideal op-
portunity to assess individual renewal applicants' performances and, in so
doing, to articulate in some coherent fashion the nature and amount of pro-
gramming which comprised the oft referred to, but seldom seen, bedrock
obligation of public interest programming. Even if the Commission was
reluctant to try to establish broad, industry-wide definitions applicable to
all situations, the comparative renewal process afforded it the opportunity
to articulate standards on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, in the compara-
tive renewal context, the Commission had the luxury of a challenging ap-
plicant who was ready, willing and able to pick through the incumbent's
records in order to demonstrate what flaws might exist in the incumbent's
performance. The presence of a challenger meant that, if the challenger
108 See supra Part V.
109 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 204, 110 Stat. 56,
112-13.110 See, e.g., Cent. Fla. Enter. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Citizens Commc'ns
Ctr. v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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itself were found to be qualified, the denial of the renewal application
would not result in any loss of service to the public.
Had the FCC been truly committed to the existence of some fundamental
programming obligation, the Commission would have fostered the com-
parative renewal process. Using the comparative renewal process's case-
by-case approach the FCC could have demonstrated to the broadcast indus-
try at least the contours, if not the specifics, of that obligation.
The history of the Commission's implementation of the comparative re-
newal process reveals a decided antipathy to the process. This antipathy
was so manifest that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ex-
pressed concern at "the possibility that settled principles of administrative
practice may be ignored because of the Commission's insecurity or unhap-
piness with the substance of the regulatory regime it is charged to en-
force. 111 According to the court, from 1961 to 1978, no incumbent had
lost its license on comparative grounds based on its past programming per-
formance." 2 Review of the subsequent history of the comparative renewal
process indicates that the Commission's perfect record was marred only
once, in In re Applications of Harriscope of Chicago, Inc. et al., in which
the challenger's application was granted on comparative grounds-and that
result occurred only after the Commission's initial grant of the incumbent's
renewal application was reversed by the court as arbitrary and capri-
cious. 13
As indicated above, the comparative renewal process was eliminated by
Congress in 1996. But at that time there were a limited number of com-
parative renewal cases still pending at various procedural stages, and Con-
gress provided that the elimination of the process for future purposes
would not be applied retroactively to prematurely terminate such pending
cases. The last comparative renewal case to be tried was Reading Broad-
casting, Inc.' ' The Commission's ultimate decision in that case strongly
"'1 Cent. Fla. Enter., 598 F.2d at 58. The Commission had, in 1970, attempted to over-
haul the comparative renewal process in a way which would have effectively guaranteed
success for the renewal applicant in virtually every case. The Court of Appeals rejected
that attempt. Citizens Commc'ns Ctr., 447 F.2d at 1214. The Commission's distaste for the
comparative renewal process lived on nevertheless. In 1988, the court observed that Chair-
man Mark Fowler had characterized the comparative renewal process as a "notably Marxist
notion." In re Monroe Commc'ns Corp., 840 F.2d 942, 946 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
112 Cent. Fla. Enter., 598 F.2d at 61.
113 See In re Applications of Harriscope of Chicago, Inc. et al. A Joint Venture d/b/a
Video 44 For Renewal of License of Station WSNS-TV, Channel 44 Chicago Illinois and
Monroe Communications Corporation For a Construction Permit, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 5 F.C.C.R. 6383 (Sept. 19, 1990). Mr. Cole was counsel for the challenging
applicant in this proceeding.
114 In re Applications of Radio Broadcasting, Inc. For Renewal of License of Station
WTVE(TV), Channel 51 Reading, Pennsylvania and Adams Communications Corporation
For Construction Permit for a New Television Station to Operate on Channel 51, Reading,
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supports the observation that, notwithstanding its rhetoric about the exis-
tence of some fundamental public interest programming obligation, the
Commission was not inclined to enforce such an obligation.
In Reading Broadcasting, the record established that the incumbent re-
newal applicant had broadcast a home shopping programming format that
included "no local news and only a scant amount of issue programming.""' 5
While the incumbent sought to add some non-entertainment programming
to its schedule at the end of the license term, the administrative law judge
hearing the case held these efforts to be "last ditch efforts ... to give an
appearance of responsive programming."' 16 The judge found that none of
that programming was issue-responsive and concluded that the incum-
bent's performance was deficient."'
But on appeal to the Commission, the FCC decided that the incumbent
should be renewed-even though the challenging applicant had been found
fully qualified to operate a new station in place of the incumbent's." 8 The
Commission agreed with the Administrative Law Judge that the incum-
bent's performance had only been "minimal,""' 9 and not deserving of any
"renewal expectancy. '' O But the Commission concluded that, largely be-
cause some of the incumbent's minority shareholders happened to reside in
the station's service area, the incumbent was entitled to a preference be-
cause, unlike the challenger, some of the incumbent's owners might be
called "local.'
12 1
The incumbent had had a five-year license term (from 1989 to 1994),
during which it had demonstrated a profound nonchalance toward public
interest programming. While its programming performance was no better
than minimal, the fact that some of the incumbent's owners happened to
live in the community of license was deemed a comparative plus because
of their supposed "knowledge of and interest in the welfare of the commu-
nity.' 122 Of course, whatever "knowledge of and interest in the welfare of
Pennsylvania, Hearing Designation Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 7176 (May 6, 1999). Mr. Cole was
counsel for the challenging applicant in this proceeding.
115 In re Reading Broadcasting, Inc. For Renewal of License of Station WTVE(TV),
Channel 51 Reading Pennsylvania and Adams Communications Corporation For Construc-
tion Permit for a New Television Station to Operate on Channel 51, Reading, Pennsyl-
vania, Initial Decision of Administrative Law Judge Richard L. Sippel, 16 F.C.C.R. 8309,
198, 199 (Apr. 2, 2001).
116 Id. 198.
1 " Id. 246.
118 In re Reading Broadcasting, Inc. For Renewal of License of Station WTVE(TV),
Channel 51 Reading Pennsylvania and Adams Communications Corporation For Construc-
tion Permit for a New Television Station to Operate on Channel 51, Reading, Pennsyl-
vania, Decision, 17 F.C.C.R. 14001, 1 (July 3, 2002).
119 Id. 59.
120 Id. 50.
121 Id 85.
122 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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the community"'123 that might have existed had not inspired those same
shareholders to seek to improve the station's performance historically, so it
was not clear how the local residence could have been deemed a positive
comparative attribute. That fact, however, was immaterial to the Commis-
sion.
It is fair to say that the Commission's historical approach to the com-
parative renewal process reinforces the observations made above. Despite
repeated assertions that broadcast licensees are subject to some fundamen-
tal, bedrock programming obligation, the fact of the matter is that the
Commission has historically taken no action at all to delineate the scope of
that supposed obligation or, more importantly, to enforce it in any mean-
ingful fashion.
VII. THE FCC'S BECHTEL PROBLEM: A BAR TO RESURRECTING
MANDATED LOCALISM?
With deregulation in place for almost three decades and with the elimina-
tion of the comparative renewal process, it might appear that any discus-
sion of localism would be unnecessary. But, as noted in the introduction to
this article, the Commission opened an inquiry into localism in 2004, and
has at least suggested that the results of that inquiry may be germane to the
ultimate disposition of the Commission's long-pending review of its media
ownership policies. Moreover, at least one other area of Commission pol-
icy, the FM allotment process, depends on assumptions arising from the
Commission's localism claims. So localism apparently lives on.
While the Localism Inquiry remains pending, the notice of inquiry which
commenced that proceeding seems to implicitly acknowledge what the
foregoing review has revealed: while the Commission has referred through
the years to some public interest-based obligation to provide local pro-
gramming, in fact and practice the Commission has never delineated even
the vaguest contours of such an obligation and has not enforced it in any
meaningful sense. While the Commission may now change its way and
announce the metes and bounds of that supposed obligation, eight decades
of history strongly suggest that will not happen.
With respect to existing localism-based policies, the Commission may
have a problem. For example, in the allotment of FM channels, the Com-
mission assigns a relatively high priority to allotment proposals which
would result in the first transmission service to a community. The underly-
ing assumption is that when the Commission allots a channel to a commu-
nity and it becomes a transmission service for that community, the station
to be operated on that channel should be expected automatically to provide
123 Id.
20071
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
local service directed to the needs and interests of that community-the so-
called Tuck policy.'24
While that assumption may have been a reasonable prediction for the
agency to make in 1946, or 1960, or maybe even 1980, it is impossible to
justify it at this point in time. As we have seen, despite FCC efforts over
decades, the agency itself has repeatedly concluded that stations were not
necessarily providing the locally-oriented, issue-responsive programming
which was supposedly required of them. As we have also seen, the only
steps which the Commission took involved the imposition of various pro-
cedural devices which were devised with the hope that they might indi-
rectly lead licensees down the path of public interest programming. But
most of those devices were eliminated more than twenty-five years ago,
and the rest have been stretched beyond utility. Thus, the Commission
cannot legitimately claim that it hopes or expects that its procedural rules
will result in locally-oriented, issue-responsive programming, because
those procedural rules are gone.
The Commission's continued application of the Tuck policy is thus sub-
ject to the same challenge that was launched, successfully, against the
comparative integration policy in Bechtel v. FCC.25 Bechtel involved a
Commission policy for comparing competing applicants for new authoriza-
tions. In a bout of pre-Kantian logic, the FCC's pure reasoning trumped
any notion of empiricism. The policy, which was based on the FCC's pre-
diction concerning the future performance of certain applicants for new
broadcast authorizations, was set out in a policy statement issued in 1965
and had been implemented routinely in hundreds of cases for the next
twenty-five years. 126 But as the appellant in Bechtel demonstrated, during
those twenty-five years the FCC never bothered to ascertain whether the
prediction underlying the policy was in fact valid in the real world. The
Commission never checked the results of comparative proceedings decided
pursuant to the integration policy in order to confirm whether the expected
results were in fact achieved. 127 Moreover, as the Bechtel appellant further
demonstrated, in the intervening twenty-five years the revision of other
Commission policies substantially undermined the validity of the Commis-
sion's initial prediction. 128
Since the integration policy was based on an unsubstantiated guess
whose validity was inconsistent with multiple other considerations, includ-
124 See, e.g., In re Applications of Faye and Richard Tuck, Inc. KBEC, Waxahachie,
Texas, Bluebonnet Radio Broadcasters, Inc. Piano, Texas, Century Broadcasting Corpora-
tion Garland, Texas, Dontron, Inc. KPBC, Garland, Texas, For Construction Permit for a
New AM Station, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 3 F.C.C.R. 5374, 3-5 (Aug. 24,
1988).
125 10 F.3d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Mr. Cole was counsel for the appellant.
126 Id. at 877.
127 Id. at 880.
128 See id at 878.
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ing revised Commission policies and conventional behavior on the part of
applicants, the court concluded that the integration policy was arbitrary and
capricious.
21
The same result could be reasonably expected if the Commission were to
award a contested FM channel to a particular community based on the
Tuck assumption that the channel will automatically result in a service di-
rected to the needs and interests of its community of license. While that
assumption might have been justified decades ago, it cannot be said to be
valid in 2007.
VIII. REVELATIONS
It is important to recognize that many broadcasters do provide locally-
oriented, issue-responsive programming. That, of course, is one of the
hallmarks of American broadcasting. But they do so not because of some
FCC-imposed localism obligation, but rather because that is what they
believe to be the best way to attract and serve their audiences and thereby
succeed in the competitive marketplace. The fact that the Commission has
been unable or unwilling since its earliest days to define and/or enforce any
such obligation is immaterial to such broadcasters, and that is as it should
be.
But it is also idle for the Commission to believe that, just because the
Commission raises its regulatory eyebrows and huffs and puffs about some
localism obligation, there exists any such obligation which the Commis-
sion is able to articulate, much less enforce. That has not been the case
since the Federal Radio Commission eighty years ago, and it is not the case
today.
129 id.
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